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BOOK REVIEWS
A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES, John P. Dawson. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 1960. Pp. x, 310. $6.50.
Professor Dawson continues to amaze. In a two year period during
which he has got out two casebooks and delivered the Cooley lectures
at Michigan, he has managed also to produce the best book on English
legal history to come out of an American law school for some time
(needlessly faint praise: it is a very good book). Even more astonish-
ing, it is, in part, a book of comparative legal history, and is based on
the relevant source materials from France and Germany. This is a
field (law) where an artful arrangement of the cullings by some re-
search assistants from the West Publishing Company's ample stores is
regarded as erudition. Moreover, the citations apparently are there
because they are relevant, and not merely because they are to works
in German.
The title, it must be said, is misleading. This is not a history of lay
judges-that surely would be a task beyond even Professor Dawson's
powers, anyway in 300 pages (though one heartily wishes he would
give it a try). Rather, it is, in form, an essay in which a thesis is
advanced for the reasons for the development of the use of lay judges
-particularly the jury-in England and their disappearance in
France and Germany. To this is appended a monograph on the work
of one manor court-that of Redgrave in Suffolk (a manor that once
belonged to the Bacons and passed from their lands into those of the
descendants of Chief Justice Holt-it is surely a happy chance that
brought precisely those records to Professor Dawson's attention).'
The thesis is, briefly (and probably not too accurately because
briefly), that throughout the Germanic kingdoms of Europe the basic
pattern of adjudication at the beginning of the Medieval period-say
the 11th century-was similar to that with which we are familiar in
England. Courts consisted of members of the social group to which
the parties belonged (who might be anything from peers of the realm
to something close to serfs). The members came from the particular
geographical unit (which again might be anything from the Holy
Roman Empire to a hundred) in which the parties lived. The court
1. There is also a brief introductory section on lay judges in Athens and Rome,
but this does not seem to me to be very relevant since the legal systems he is prin-
cipally talking about were all Germanic in origin. Insofar as they were influenced
by Roman procedure, it was by the procedure of the later Empire, especially by
way of church courts, and not by the earlier bifurcated system of praetor and
iudex.
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itself was relatively passive and simply watched to see that the parties
observed the traditional intricate procedures, including precise repeti-
tions of certain formulas (best illustrated, perhaps, in Njal's Saga).
The proof, if the case ever got that far, would consist of something
like an ordeal, trial by battle or the giving of oaths. It would be, in
other words, by our terms, irrational, and by any terms, cumbersome.
This procedure was unsatisfactory, especially after the Church began
to discourage ordeals and trials by battle, and as the central govern-
ments began to establish courts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
first in England, and then in France, it began to be replaced by more
"rational" methods of proof. It was here, however, that there were
differences. In England, the trial method selected by the crown for
use by its growing courts was the jury. This developed, probably, out
of the old Frankish inquest since it consisted at first of the king's
officers questioning the residents of particular areas about various
matters such as land-holding, crimes, etc. The bulk of the trial-the
finding of facts-was carried on not by the judge but by the jury.
The Bench in England remained very small (as it does still), but it
was, nevertheless, able to supplant the old local and the newer feudal
jurisdictions in most instances. In France, though almost the same
background existed, this did not occur. Instead, the new royal courts
began to use the canonist procedure in which facts were determined
by the questioning of witnesses in secret under oath by the judges.
Generally the witnesses were brought before the court by the parties.
A development similar to that of France took place in Germany two
centuries later in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
It is Professor Dawson's thesis that this difference in development
is the result of the existence in England of a strong central govern-
ment which could generally enforce obedience by its subjects through-
out the kingdom, and which could, in consequence, force small groups
of its subjects to come to a central place to answer questions about
crimes or other matters arising in their neighborhoods despite their
great unwillingness to do so. This was not the situation in France
where the king's authority was frequently non-existent in fact, though
he was the nominal ruler. He had, of necessity, to rely on his own
employees and to have them question such witnesses as the parties
brought to them (remembering that criminal trials were also usually
private prosecutions) -it would not normally be necessary for the
court to force any witness to come before it. Once these decisions were
made-and they were made more or less unconsciously-they affected
all subsequent developments in both countries. The English tended to
keep the paid officials at a minimum, and to use laymen widely, even
in Equity when it developed, whereas in France the increase of judges
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and minor judicial officials is notorious (and Professor Dawson gives
some horrible examples in case it is not).
The thesis is a very interesting one, since it offers a novel approach
to the problem of the difference in legal development between France
and England, and it is probably a very fruitful one. By this route one
might well arrive at some answer to the question-which seems to me
to be of overriding importance-why the Common Law has seemed to
be the legal system most hospitable to the development of liberty (and
Professor Dawson gives a few pointers). To be sure, he has not
proved his thesis. It is not the sort of thesis that can be proved. It
would be necessary, for one thing, to examine a number of other coun-
tries which had similar backgrounds-Switzerland, Holland, Flanders,
and Scandinavia for some-to see what happened there. Moreover,
"France" is probably not an entirely proper subject for investigation.
It would seem to be necessary to investigate different parts of France
separately, for though the central government was frequently weak
the major feudatories were usually not. After all, at least one prov-
ince, Gascony, was, during almost all the relevant time, in English
hands. What happened to the procedure there? Germany, of course,
is even less of a unity, as Professor Dawson points out. The path of
such an investigation is well laid out, however. Professor Dawson has
given a very complete summary of English developments and an ex-
cellent introduction to those in France and Germany. He has, in other
words, done a more than satisfactory job in making a prima facie case
for an arresting and important thesis.
He has done quite a lot more too. For one thing, in the process of
explaining the English developments, he has written the best short
account of the development of the English judicial system that I have
seen, and has gone a good way towards writing a history of the proce-
dure of the English trial (a very murky area indeed). Perhaps most
important, his book is based almost entirely on secondary authorities. 2
This means that he has done the immensely valuable job of synthesis-
ing what almost all the important legal historians of three countries
(counting the United States and Britain as one) have had to say about
this aspect of their histories. If anyone should be interested in pur-
suing the matter further, his path is well laid out. Moreover, Professor
Dawson's familiarity with continental developments permits him to
look more clearly at the English scene,3 and in general his development
2. A notable exception is his reference to the practice of the English Chancellor
during the sixteenth century of using arbitration for which he makes reference to
the original records of the court. Pp. 163-69. And, of course, the last section of
the book on the Redgrave Manor materials is entirely based on original records.
3. See, for example, the light he casts on the extremely vexing problem of the
influence of canonist procedure on Equity procedure. Pp. 146-59.
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of the general background from secondary sources points up to the
original sources that he does use.
There are, the conscientious reviewer is pleased to note (and thereby
save a shred of his self-respect), a few errors in the book. Thus Eng-
lish peers no longer have a right to be tried in the House of Lords,
having lost it in 1948.4 I might add that it seems to me that his refer-
ences to the advantages which the royal courts had over others because
they had the jury as opposed to wager of law, overlook the fact that
many Englishmen much preferred wager of law, and perhaps not en-
tirely irrationally5 Doubtless there are a number of others which
a more careful and more erudite reader than I would pick up, and
doubtless too, they are equally unimportant. What should be empha-
sized, it seems to me, is how many insights into legal history, espe-
cially, though not entirely, the Common Law, one gets on almost every
page-not least because of the fact that equal treatment to that given
to the royal courts is given to the local courts. It is a book, in short, to
read and reread-that is, at any rate, what I intend to do with it.
And yet, of course, no one to speak of will read it, and of those who
do, it is likely that no one will do with it what should be done-tear it
apart; build on it; disagree with it; entirely disprove it ;-principally
-use it. Professor Dawson's thesis is not so startling as Professor
Tawney's, and hence not likely to start a major battle,6 but it is suffi-
ciently novel to justify some spirited skirmishes. There will not be
any, however. English legal history is neither taught nor studied in
American law schools 7 (neither is American legal history but that is
another, almost more disheartening, story). Several of the larger law
schools (to say nothing of the smaller) have no one on their faculties
4. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, § 30.
5. See, for example, Professor Dawson's statement on p. 185 that the royal
courts had an advantage over seignorial courts in that they had the "special
attraction of jury trial." In the borough, at least, the compurgatory oath, even
in criminal matters, was a fiercely prized right. When one considers the close-knit
nature of medieval urban society, it is perhaps not hard to understand why it
should be thought better to have available the right to escape punishment if a
sufficient number of one's fellow citizens (whom one had chosen) would uphold
one's oath, rather than to be left to the result of forced questioning of a mis-
cellaneous group. The worthies of the town would be unlikely to support with oaths
a known wrongdoer unless they approved the wrong, and they would be likely to
know the facts. See 2 Selden Society, Borough Customs xxvii-xxxiii (Bateson
ed. 1906).
6. See Hexter, Storm over the Gentry, Encounter, May 1958, p. 22.
7. One has nowadays a slightly sour sensation when reading Maitland's intro-
duction to volume 1 of the Selden Society's edition of the Yearbooks of Edward II
(1903), in which he laments that it may be necessary to send English scholars to
this side of the Atlantic (to Harvard) to be trained in the old English law (p.
xxxii).
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who is qualified to teach it, and no one tries-although most such
schools have rather valuable library collections for its study, and
would make quite strenuous and expensive efforts to repair any gaps
that might be uncovered in them. The worship of our ancestors is
apparently in the debased form in which only the idols remain-well
preserved and cared-for, but with even their names unknown. Perhaps
it is as well. On the one hand, the law schools can concentrate on such
practical matters as "legal medicine" (How to Fake a Back Injury to
the irreverent), while on the other, there are the rich fields of inter-
disciplinary research, to say nothing of International Legal Studies.
But to carp like this is to be ungrateful." One should be very thank-
ful that there is at least one such person as Professor Dawson, and
that he has given us this fine book. Though it is not being too greedy,
I trust, to hope that he might sometime follow it up with another on
the same subject.
WILLIAM C. JONESt
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Paul A. Freund.
Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian Books. 1961. Pp. 224. $1.35.
Prominently mentioned among the candidates to ascend to the recent
vacancy on the Supreme Court was Professor Paul Freund of the
Harvard Law School. Although President Kennedy's first appointment
went to Deputy Attorney General White, it is quite possible that Pro-
fessor Freund may yet participate in the Court's deliberations-both
because of his undisputed eminence in the area of constitutional law,
and also his long established association with the President as a legal
advisor. Thus, his most recent work, The Supreme Court of the United
States, is deserving of attention not only as an excellent analysis of
the Court's role in our national life, but also as a guidepost in predict-
ing future judicial behavior.
There can be little doubt that Professor Freund is not in alliance
with that wing of the Court which speaks in terms of absolutes when
considering cases involving the Bill of Rights.1 The disharmonies be-
tween his position and that viewpoint which is generally attributed
to the "activist" wing would not, I believe, proceed along channels of
judicial restraint, as expounded by Justice Frankfurter and Judge
Hand,2 but rather find their source in a respect for a balancing or
8. Though I think it is justified to carp at the fact that there is no bibliography.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Mr. Justice Black's adherence to an interpretation of the Bill of Rights as
unmistakably absolute is contained in Black, The Bill of Rights 35 N.Y.U.L. REV.
865 (1960).
2. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 87-91 (1961) [herein-
after cited as FREUND]. See, for example, the concurring opinion of Justices
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